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In the principal case the judgment was reversed and remanded on
the weight of the evidence because of the ambiguity in the testimony of
the plaintiff's key witness. In the event of the introduction of substantial
evidence upon a new trial, it would seem necessary for the plaintiff, in
order to charge the defendant with notice of an alleged defective condi-
tion, to establish that Zinn & Co. was an agent, with authority by reason
of being such, by contract or custom, to appoint the sub-agent, who sub-
sequently employed other sub-agents, of notice within the scope of his
employment.
MARGARETTA BEYNON
TEST FOR ESTABLISHING RELATIONSHIP
While riding in a bus the plaintiff was injured in a head-on collision
with a taxi cab owned by defendant cab company. The driver of the
cab obtained the cab from the defendant by paying a deposit of $4.25
each morning, receiving the cab to use for the day as he saw fit. The
defendant also maintained call stations where the cab drivers might
receive calls by waiting their turn in line. The court dismissed the peti-
tion, holding that in the absence of evidence indicating that the defendant
had any right to exercise any acts of control over the acts of the cab
driver after the cab was turned over to him in the morning, there was
no agency existing between the driver and the owner of the cab so as to
make the owner liable for the negligence of the driver. Hudson v. Ohio
Bus Line Co. and Parkway Cabs, Inc., 23 Ohio Abs. 634, 8 Ohio O.P.
312 (1937).
It may be stated as a general proposition that when the employer has
the right to control the employee in the performance of his work the
latter is a servant, as distinguished from an independent contractor.
Babbitt v. Say, 120 Ohio St. I77, I65 N.E. 721 (1929); Kar v. The
Erie Rd. Co., I18 Ohio St. 612, 162 N.E. 793 (1928); Kruse v.
Revelson, I15 Ohio St. 594, 155 N.E. 137 (1927); Gechei v. Boltz,
13 Ohio App. ISo, 31 Ohio C.A. 5o6 (1920); Collier and Sons
Distr. Corp. v. Drinkwater, Si Fed. (2d) 200 (1936); Bohanon v.
James McClatchy Pub. Co., 16 Cal. App. (2d) 188, 6o Pac. (2d)
510 (1936); Keeling v. Nall, 261 Ky. 232, 87 S.W. (2d) 370
(1935); Annotations, 75 A.L.R. 725 (1931); 19 A.L.R. 226, sub-
section 6 (1922); 14 R.C.L. 67 (1916). Many decisions require
control as tQ the "manner and means" of doing the work, or control
as to the "means of accomplishing the result," or control as to the
"details" of the work. Klar v. The Erie Rd. supra; Spears Dairy, Inc.
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v. Bohrer, 54 S.W. (2d) 872 (Tex., 1932); Moaten v. Columbia
Cotton Oil Co., 97 S.W. (2d) 629 (Ark., 1936); Hughes v. Railway
Co., 39 Ohio St. 461, 7 O.D. Rep. 502 (1883); Snodgrass v. Cleve-
land Co-op Coal Co., 31 Ohio App. 470, 167 N.E. 493 (1929);
Lassen v. Stamford Transit Co., 102 Conn. 76, 128 Ad. 117 (1925).
A better statement of the general rule is that an independent contractor
is a person employed to perform work on the terms that he is to be free
from the control of the employer as respects the manner in which the
details of the work are to be executed, Annotation, 19 A.L.R. 235
(1922). Moreover, where the right to control exists it is immaterial
that there was in fact no control exercised. Pickens v. Diecker, 21 Ohio
St. 212, 8 Am. Rep. 55 (1871); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v.
Bennett, 36 Okla. 358, 128 Pac. 705, 20 A.L.R. 678 (1912); Knice-
ley v. W. Va. Midland R. Co., 64 W. Va. 278, 61 S.E. 811, 17
L.R.A. (N.S.) 370 (1908).
A few courts, however, do not recognize or apply this generally
accepted doctrine, saying that no objective test can be set up to deter-
mine the existence of a master-servant relationship, but that each case
must be determined upon its facts. One recent decision states that the
existence of the right of the employer to control the employee is the
most important, though not the controlling, fact to be considered in the
determination of a master-servant relationship on this basis. Kehrer et
al. v. Industrial Comm., 365 Ill. 378, 6 N.E. (2d) 635 (1937).
In the principal case the driver of the cab received the cab for the
day to use "as he saw fit." In this case, as in the case of Whitehall
Chev. Co. v. Anderson, 53 Ga. App. 406, 186 S.E. 135 (1936),
where an auto salesman was left free to perform the details of his work
in any manner he wished, no right of control by the employer existed
and therefore there was no master-servant relationship. Another com-
parable case is Consolidated Motors, Inc. v. Ketcham, 66 Pac. (2d)
246 (Ariz., 1937), where no right to control the employee in the "phys-
ical conduct" of his work existed, and, the employer was held not liable
for the negligent conduct of the employee. In a recent Ohio decision
on facts very similar to those in the principal case, Coviello v. Industrial
Comm., 129 Ohio St. 589, 196 N.E. 661 (I935), the cab driver rented
the cab at a stipulated rate per day and drove wherever he chose in the
city, further agreeing, however, to wear a uniform cap, answer calls
promptly and to obey other rules concerning courtesy and neatness oF
appearance. The court there found no master-servant relationship to
exist.
In a few cases the plaintiff has sought to apply the doctrine of
estoppel. But since, in the principal case, as the court points out, the
plaintiff was not a passenger in the defendant's cab, he could not be
said to have in any way relied upon an apparent agency. Even where
reliance has been established it must be further shown to find an estoppel
that reliance 'induced the parties to have the collision.' Keeling v. Nall,
sutra. Contra, Middleton v. Frances, 257 Ky. 42, 77 S.W. (2d) 425
(1934).
Since no estoppel is to be found in the principal case, the plaintiff
must recover, if at all, upon the basis of the employment relationship
existing between the driver and the owner of the cab. In view of the
above authorities it would appear that as a matter of law no master-
servant relationship existed and the court was correct in dismissing the
petition.
JUSTIN J. GRIBBELL
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION- GOING AND COMING RULE -
ATTENDING CONVENTION
The general phrase "in the course of the employment," found in
the Ohio Constitution, Art. II, sec. 35 and the Ohio Gen. Code, sec.
I4 65 -68 in connection with compensable injuries, has been construed
in two recent Ohio decisions, which present extremes in their respective
fact situations.
The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. owns a property in the city of
Akron on the south side of East Market St. extending adjacently to the
sidewalk for approximately 2500 feet. On this street the company
maintains an entrance gate for employees and 300 to 400 feet east of
it on the same side of the street an "East Gate" used only by tractors
for loading and unloading purposes. The plaintiff, an employee of the
company, had the option of taking several routes to work. While cross-
ing on the sidewalk in front of the "East Gate," he was struck by a
tractor of the company, coming out of the gate, driven by a company
employee. The plaintiff recovered in a common law action for dam-
ages. This was affirmed on appeal by the company, the court refusing
to hold that the injury occurred in the course of the employment on the
following grounds: (I) it was not a necessary incident of plaintiff's
employment that he use said sidewalk; (2) the sidewalk, a part of a
public street, was not in the zone of control of the company; (3) he
suffered hazards common to the public; and (4) plaintiff had not
reached the place where he could enter the defendant's premises to
perform his duties. Fike v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 56 Ohio
App. 197, 23 Ohio Abs. 480, 9 Ohio Op. 312 (1937).
119NOTES AND COMMENTS
